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Preamble
One of the easiest things to do is to live a LIE. Another word for this is 
DELUSION. But again sometimes, Delusion thrives on its twin – 
Ignorance. As the Bible says, my people perish for lack of knowledge 
(Hosea 4:6). It is this lack of knowledge which essentially hall-marks 
Nigeria's status as an oil producer.
For those who really know, Nigeria is not an oil producer. Nigeria does 
not produce oil. Rather, the oil is being produced for her by the 
multinational oil companies. Consequently, Vice-Chancellor Sir, 
colleagues, ladies and gentlemen, Nigeria's authentic status is really 
that of the recipient of relatively vast and providential oil revenues. 
The operative words here are “relatively” and “providential”. And this 
may well explain why Nigeria continues to be caught in the throes of 
underdevelopment. In simple terms, providential revenues cannot be 
the basis of development. The former, i.e. Providence, just happens; 
while the latter i.e. Development is a conscious choice and process. 
The illusion of an oil producing status is also accompanied by other 
illusions, which form an integral part of our national life.
I do not intend to insult our brothers from the South-South. But over 
time, a sartorial style, or new dress-sense has been given a new name. 
This style of dressing is called: “Resource Control”. Any time, I hear 
this phrase, “Resource Control”, I wince and shrink within myself. 
This is because Resource Control is an apt reference to the oil wealth in 
the Niger Delta.
But Vice Chancellor Sir, ladies and gentlemen, that oil or that resource 
is not being controlled by Nigeria. There are indeed other invincible 
forces which control that oil. One easy way of knowing and 
appreciating this is that, there are three critical phases in the oil 
industry; Upstream; Mid-stream and Downstream. Nigeria, is only 
present, and marginally too, in only one of these streams – the first 
one. She is totally absent in the other two streams. This is the unfolding 
6and searing tragedy that we will be speaking to in this lecture. And as 
you, my listeners, can guess by now, our story this afternoon is not a 
sweet one. It is the story of a misguided, ignorant and backward 
political class, which is driving Nigeria to the precipice. Unfortunately, 
and I repeat unfortunately, the outcome of what is being said here has 
been rendered in melodic terms by some of our famed Juju musicians 
– Awon kan waiye wa sise; Awon kan waiye wa gbowo. 
– Ise  kekere, owo lanla, Jah Jehovah, o, ma se wa lo nise.
These two songs, speak seriously and tragically to the Nigerian 
condition; i.e the gulf between production on the one hand; and 
consumption on the other. And, in a way they also signpost, the Yamani 
Syndrome on the one hand; and the ominous admonitions of Perez 
Alfonso on the other.           
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 Are we not all parasites? For a country which
 Consumes, without producing anything, it is 
 just about time we refocus the debate.
      - Sanya Oni
1.0 INTRODUCTION
When the idea of this public lecture was broached to me; it did not take 
me a long time to decide on the theme thrust of oil. This is because for 
over 30 years, I have been involved in teaching and research in the 
specific and inter-related areas of Oil and Nigeria, in the context of 
domestic dynamics and International Politics. 
In this respect it is probably relevant to mention here that at the 
Masters; Doctoral and Post-doctoral levels, I have worked on 
seemingly diverse themes like: The Role of OPEC in International 
Politics; Nigerian Petroleum Policy and External Relations; and the 
Legality of the 1973 Arab Oil Embargo.
In the process, I have researched and written on issues like:- Potency 
and Limitations; The Dilemma of OPEC in the New International 
Economic Order; Oil and the Military; and Local Government 
Areas: The Ultimate Whetstones of the Nigerian Petroleum 
Industry.
As the audience can readily appreciate, in these various studies, I have 
gone from the global through the national to the local level. The last of 
these topics, i.e. the focus on local government derives a measure of 
prophetic significance from the fact that it was written, way back in 
1983. At that point in time, the Niger Delta was far from being the pet 
research project that it has now turned out to be.
In other words, implicit in that piece, was a prophetic insight, which 
appeared to have fore-shadowed subsisting and contemporary realities 
in the Niger Delta. It is against this background of my previous 
intellectual endeavours that one can begin to appreciate the thematic 
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thrust of today's lecture titled: Oil, Nigeria and The Yamani 
Syndrome.
Mr. Vice-Chancellor Sir, Ladies and Gentlemen, this lecture is taking 
place in the context of great possibilities and expectations in our 
immediate locality. I refer specifically to our drive to be one of ten in 
ten. But in the larger context, the melody is not as sweet. The gladiators 
in the political arena are busy crossing swords and beating the drums of 
war. And such is the din which assails the land. And, I tell you, these 
jostlings and joustings are not for fun. The near-mortal struggle derives 
from the motivation of those who seek privileged access to Nigeria's 
oil resources. Again, in the larger context, the land is currently reeling 
from the throes of a fatigued Presidency. 
Unfortunately there is a perverse consistency to the immediate 
foregoing. Our song this afternoon is also not so sweet. Therefore, 
what I seek to do in the remaining time that is available is to take a bold 
and realistic look at Nigeria's Petroleum Policy and Politics in the light 
of evolving realities in Nigeria, the Niger Delta, and global politics.
In carrying out this agendum, I will be looking at various features, 
which have continued to define oil, Nigeria and the wider world. In the 
process, I will be dwelling on features like oil, its diplomacy and 
contemporary concerns like the environment and consequent impact 
on international politics. 
In the ensuing sub-sections of this lecture, I will be focusing on 
features like: Oil Diplomacy; Multinationals; The Nigerian State and 
Oil Revenues as well as the Environment and The Response of The 
Nigerian State to The Niger Delta Problem.
 
2.0 OIL DIPLOMACY
Oil diplomacy revolves around local forces, as well as transnational 
forces, with the Nigerian state as a major social force. The interesting 
thing to note here is that, the nature of Nigeria's oil diplomacy has 
9  
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substantially changed in form and character. Initially, and in a broad 
sense, Nigeria's oil diplomacy revolved around three actors:  the 
Nigerian state, other countries (Western and developing) in the 
international system; and the multinational oil companies.
This type of rather simplistic oil diplomacy can be observed in the fact 
that the protagonists were essentially state actors and multinational oil 
companies who in any case, did not act alone, since they were virtual 
extensions or indeed complementary organs of their home 
governments.
In making this latter point, I am drawing extensively on the assertions 
of Louis Turner, who argued that the oil companies do not act alone. 
Rather, according to Turner, they do so in what has been called an 
implicit and explicit alliance of interests, with their home 
governments. In other words, as the classic oil diplomacy goes; 
entities like ExxonMobil, British Petroleum and Total can only be 
fully appreciated in a context, which takes on board countries like The 
United States of America, Britain and France respectively. 
A detailed and empirical version of what has been sketched above can 
be observed as early as the sixties in the heat of the Nigerian civil war. 
At that point in time, there was  an altercation among Nigeria, Shell-
 2 
BP and the then break-away State of Biafra.
Similarly, another scenario of oil diplomacy was played out between 
Nigeria and Britain, when the former decided to nationalize the assets 
of British Petroleum. In this respect, what Nigeria did was to use oil as 
a basis to re-define the relationship between her and this extra-Africa 
power. The action defied the normal turn of events in the international 
system. In other words, the tenor of classical diplomacy is such that, 
the developing countries in the normal order of international relations, 
are usually at the receiving end of the power equation in their dealings 
with the more powerful countries. 
10
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But this critical resource i.e. oil, was able to re-define this 
relationship. It was not only Britain that was at the receiving end of 
this oil offensive from Nigeria. A similar situation even held for a 
super-power like the United States of America. In this respect, Bassey 
Ate has argued that, owing largely to oil revenues, Nigeria made 
vigorous bids to the United States as regards African issues. Such 
African affairs can be located in various contexts like, Gowon's 
unyielding resistance to the Nixon administration, Mohammed's 
historic challenge to President Ford over Angola and Obasanjo's 
progressive partnership with Jimmy Carter, as regards the liquidation 
3
of Ian Smith's settler colonialism in Zimbabwe. 
Even forces within the American political system itself were of the 
view that on the basis of America's seeming dependence on Nigeria's 
oil imports, Pretoria's influence on the United States foreign policy 
declined substantially in favour of Nigeria.
Even then, Nigeria's oil inspired diplomacy was not confined to the 
Western powers. The country's role in West Africa and the wider 
African continent has in the course of time, also acquired a much more 
vibrant profile.  And one forum through which this has been pursued 
is in the country's aid commitments. It has been contended that it is the 
availability of oil revenues which has ensured a place for Nigeria in 
the league of donors. 
It is instructive to appreciate here that in the post – 1973 oil boom era, 
earnings from petroleum were of the then stupendous order of six 
billion naira, and as such, more vent was given to Nigeria's ambitions 
as far as intra-African relations were concerned. It is also important to 
note that, Nigeria's aid programme could be located at two levels. 
Those disbursed at the bilateral level, and those given at the 
multilateral level through institutions like the Organization of 
11
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Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC); The African Development 
Bank and the Commonwealth Fund for Technical Cooperation. 
A consistent feature of this aid programme was Nigeria's commitment 
to the then evolving issues in Southern Africa. The depth of this 
commitment was such that Nigeria defied geographical realities and 
limitations to emerge as a frontline State in the then struggle against 
apartheid. We might as well add here that Nigeria's aid diplomacy, 
owing to the self-same variable of oil has since crystallized into what is 
now known as the Technical Aid Corps Scheme (TACS). 
Under this Programme, Nigeria sends skilled manpower to various 
countries in the developing world. The situation therefore is such that 
Nigerian doctors, teachers, nurses (and what have you) are in various 
4
areas of the developing world, hoisting Nigeria's flag. 
All of the foregoing seems to show-up Nigeria as a vigorous social 
force which has been able to hold her own in the comity of nations, 
owing to the critical variable called oil. But, as I will go on to 
demonstrate shortly, this self-same variable, constitutes the Achilles' 
heel of the Nigerian State. This is because it has spawned a situation 
which has shown up the under belly of the Nigerian State. 
This in itself is a paradox.  It is a paradox in the sense that the self-same 
oil, which happens to be the basis of Nigeria's visible standing in 
global diplomacy, is at the same time, the nemesis of the Nigerian 
State. It is   in view of this paradox that Nigeria has been described in 
5
an oxymoronic way, as “a failed successful state” 
There are however new dimensions to Nigeria's oil diplomacy. This 
novel dimension can be observed in the fact that, forces below the 
state, particularly in the Niger Delta, are now involved in the crisis-
ridden relationship between the Nigerian State and the international 
system. The site of this struggle is the Niger Delta. And the crisis 
12
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spawned by this intermingling of forces is what has been referred to 
as the Niger Delta crisis.
It is apposite to stress here that the Niger Delta crisis is in fact a 
misnomer as far as crises go. This is because what is generally and 
glibly referred to as the Niger Delta crisis, is, in fact a series of crises. 
Perhaps the most obvious of these crises has to do with the crisis 
spawned by environmental degradation and the virtual absence of the 
state in a positive and wholesome way. 
What is perhaps less well known and appreciated is that this and other 
aspects of the Niger Delta crises are owed to the rather interesting but 
dismal relationship with the oil companies on the one hand and the 
Nigerian state on the other. It is this seemingly productive but uneven 
relationship which has in fact given rise to the other visible crises in 
the Niger Delta. Our main argument here is that the way oil revenues 
and the oil companies have played out in Nigeria is such that other 
crises have necessarily been spawned in the Niger Delta. Indeed, we 
will now turn to what can be called the super-structural dimensions of 
the Niger Delta crisis.
3.0 MULTINATIONALS, THE NIGERIAN STATE AND 
OIL REVENUES 
The relationship between the Nigerian State and multinationals has 
passed through various phases. These phases, include: the concession 
era and various forms of participation like: the joint venture 
agreements, production-sharing agreements and the risk service 
contracts. It will also be clear in the subsequent narrative that the 
Nigerian state also responded to international initiatives in its attempt 
to re-define its relationship with the oil companies.
But despite the changing phases of the relationship between the 
Nigerian state and the multinationals, the ultimate and persisting 
outcomes, have been the hegemony of the oil companies and their 
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parent governments. And the hegemony is such that, the Nigerian 
State is locked in a relationship of hopeless dependence on the oil 
companies. But this is only one side of the picture. And one visible 
instance of this hopeless dependence can be observed in the fact that 
when, a company like Shell declares a 'force majeur', the tremors will 
be felt in Aso Rock and the Governors' Lodges across the country. 
However, a comprehensive insight reveals that despite these features 
of hopelessness and dependency, the Nigerian State has still been able 
to possess vast and providential oil revenues, courtesy of the 
6
exploratory efforts of the oil companies. 
It is arguable that this vast, unearned, and unmerited wealth 
constitutes the structural foundations of the Niger Delta crises. This 
particular crisis, which Fela Anikulapo Kuti, derisively called 
“Money Miss Road” has in turn, spawned other crises in the Niger 
Delta. These sub-crises, as I have chosen to call them include: 
environmental degradation, deprivations, violence, poverty, and 
illegal oil bunkering; as well as what can be called the international 
dimensions of the Niger Delta crises. 
Mr. Vice Chancellor, Ladies and Gentlemen, it is instructive to stress 
here that these various dimensions of the crises cannot be located in 
episodic compartments. Rather, they interface with one another, in a 
systemic manner which tend-to bewilder the omniscient observer as 
regards what the Niger Delta crisis is all about. In the bid to effect a 
measure of clarity, therefore, we will turn, if only briefly, to the 
various aspects of these crises.
4.0 THE ENVIRONMENTAL DIMENSION
The environmental hazards which were spawned by the Nigerian oil 
industry were not initially appreciated by the various scholars and 
observers of the oil industry. In this respect, two broad categories of 
scholars were identified; these were the radical and orthodox scholars. 
The former was represented by individuals like Claude Ake, Terisa 
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Turner and Segun Osoba. Meanwhile, the orthodox category was 
amply projected by individuals like F.R. Marinho, O. Shyllon and M. 
Feyide. 
In making this categorization, it should be noted that, at this point in 
time, we are referring to a temporal frame-work in which, concern for 
the environments was neither the fad nor the rage that it has since 
become. Rather, it was an issue which was essentially being addressed 
by what can be described as a minority fringe in the world of oil 
. 7
scholarship
In those earlier days, scholars like, Soremekun, Lawanson and 
Biodela Warioboko, were to be seen, drawing attention to what can be 
called early and pioneering attention to the issues of the environment 
as these relate to the oil industry. In this respect, way back in 1983, I 
dwelt extensively on the environmental and consequent health hazards 
which have been spawned by the Nigerian oil industry.  
Indeed, it has been noted that in much more contemporary times, other 
analysts have joined in, such that there is a near absolute consensus on 
the impact of the oil industry on the environment, Perhaps, the main 
contributions of such latter-day analysts is that their studies have been 
much more detailed. This particularistic strain is very evident in the 
works of individuals like: Gbadegesin, Isichie, Obi Alakpedia, Nnimo 
 8
Bassey and Azibaolanri. 
One major fall-out of the environmental degradation in the Niger 
Delta is the poverty in the area. The poverty has in turn been 
responsible for the pervasive violence in the area. As regards the 
former i.e. poverty, Ken Saro Wiwa has been able to link it to the 
degradation in the environment when, in a rather graphic way, he 
declared that an ecological war is highly lethal, the moreso, as it is 
unconventional.  According to him: “It is homicidal in its effect. 
15
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Human life, flora, fauna, the air fall at its feet, and finally the land itself 
dies". In view of this scorched earth situation, which is rendered more 
dangerous by the fact of its invisibility, there is little wonder that 
poverty is very pervasive in the Niger Delta.
This is only to be expected in a context, where the main pillar of 
livelihood, i.e. the environment has been reduced to rubble. The 
poverty is rendered more searing and graphic by the fact that it is even 
below the average in a poor country like Nigeria. In other words, the 
poverty in the Niger Delta is of such magnitude that, to live in the 
Niger Delta in an impoverished country like Nigeria, is to be counted 
among the poorest of the poor. Yet, what is at issue here is not a natural 
phenomenon. It is essentially man-made. This is in view of the fact that 
prior to the advent of oil exploration, nature provided bounty for the 
people in that region. In this respect, it has been pointed out that, the 
fertile alluvial soil of the Niger Delta plain(s) provided a rich harvest 
of yams, cassava and vegetables. Similarly, the pure streams and seas 
9
brimmed with fish and other sea food. 
As already pointed out, much of the immediate foregoing can be 
located in the innocent days of pre-oil exploration. The situation has 
significantly changed for the worse, such that the pervasive poverty 
has in turn given rise to the various shades of violence in the region. 
This violence can be located at different levels. There is the violence 
which exists between the oil communities on the one hand, and the oil 
companies on the other. There is also the intra-community violence, 
which more often than not occurs when factions and fractions in 
communities struggle over resources like land and compensation 
benefits from the oil companies.  Moreover, there is the violence 
which has been instigated by the various political gladiators in the 
Niger Delta.  In the process when these gladiators lose control, the 
violence assumes a momentum of its own. There is also the violence in 
16
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the larger political arena among various fractions and factions of the 
Nigerian ruling (ruining) class.  As if to indicate that the violence is 
instrumental in its import and projections, it is useful to appreciate that 
what is at stake in the various political conflicts are vast providential 
revenues flowing from oil. In concrete terms, the conflicts become 
more comprehensible when one realizes that political office holders, 
as reported in the newspapers earn salaries of the order of 100 million 
naira, 75 million naira, 60 million per month, et cetera.
There is also the tussle among the status-quo forces in the 
international system, in those days, the violence was open-ended 
among Britain, France, United States and Italy …….   
Mr. Vice-Chancellor, Ladies and gentlemen, it will be recalled that   
the violence has assumed a more frightening and heightened 
dimension in view of the fact that it was until recently hall-marked by 
the inter-related features of militancy, kidnapping and consequent 
demand for what can be regarded as hefty ransoms. The remarkable 
thing here is that, sometimes, these counter-criminal actions have 
little or nothing to do with oil-exploration and other related activities. 
This is evident for instance, when workers of an aluminum Company 
or those of Julius Berger, are abducted for ransom purposes.
It is the same pattern of apparent irrationality that can be observed, 
when critical social forces and their relatives are kidnapped by the 
counter-criminals in the Niger-Delta.  However, much of the 
foregoing speaks essentially to the domestic currents of the Niger-
Delta crisis.
We will now turn, if only briefly, to the international dimensions of the 
Niger-Delta issue.
At this point in time, it is necessary to recall that, all along, i.e. right 
from the inception of oil exploration, the international dimension has 
17
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always been present.
The interesting thing here is that what this dimension really represents 
is the interface between non-state actors and states.  It was also a 
complex situation in which States like Nigeria, the United States and 
Britain, along with the oil companies, were having relations, although 
of a subversive order, with the oil producing communities.
This interlocking network was the structure which sustained the 
Nigerian oil industry.
But in the course of time, rumblings started to come from below the 
Nigerian State. As we will subsequently see, these rumblings 
eventually threw up other non-state actors, which ultimately 
succeeded in turning the entire Niger-Delta into a zone of low 
intensity conflict, which may well worsen in the course of time.
It is arguable that a pioneering non-state actor was in the form of an 
Isaac Adaka Boro, who decided to take on the Nigerian State for its 
neglect of the Niger-Delta.  But after 12 days, the armed rebellion was 
crushed.  It is instructive to note here that even at this point in time, a 
non-state actor like Isaac Adaka Boro, made overtures to a segment of 
the international system. 
But he was rebuffed, as this segment would have nothing to do with 
none of what was considered to be his heady idealism.  Then entered 
Ken Saro Wiwa many years later. And here, the picture began to 
change significantly. Initially, Ken Saro Wiwa attempted to draw 
attention to the tragedy in the Niger-Delta, through lectures and 
regular appearances in Nigerian newspapers. This was complemented 
with a comprehensive awareness and sensitization of the Ogoni.  
Indeed, and as I pointed out in an earlier study, he was able to tap into 
the largely radical heritage of Nigerian newspapers, which often 
postures on the side of the underdog.  
18
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Still in practical terms, very little was achieved as regards either 
reforming the Nigerian state, or the unholy alliance between the self-
same state and the oil companies.  It is this immediate background 
which impelled Saro-Wiwa to carry the battle outside Nigeria. And 
this is precisely how the rest of the international community (states 
and non-states), particularly the latter, became involved in the 
10
worsening politics and conditions of the Nigerian oil industry. 
On the part of the Nigerian State, she has attempted to manage the 
Niger-Delta crises through various measures.  These include 
subversive generosity to and negotiations with the militants, coercive 
diplomacy, cooption, and the establishment of various state bodies   
like OMPADEC, the NDDC and the Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs 
as well as increased allocations of funds to the oil producing states of 
the Niger-Delta.  These measures will now be examined in turn.
5.0 THE RESPONSE OF THE STATE TO THE NIGER-
DELTA PROBLEM
A number of analysts have dated the initial response of the State to the 
Willink Commission of 1958.  Strictly speaking, this is hardly valid.  
This is because the Willink Commission was only charged with the 
responsibility of enquiring into the fears of minority groups in the 
Niger-Delta, and how to assuage same.  In other words, the oil 
industry was still at a fledgling state, such that the problems of the 
industry were yet to be very visible to anyone.  Despite the immediate 
foregoing, one of the results of the Willink Commission was the 
establishment of the Niger-Delta Development Board.  
However, the Board was not established until 1960.  The Board was 
given the mandate of managing the developmental needs and 
challenges of the region, then segmented into the Yenogoa Province, 
Degema Province, the Ogoni Division of Port-Harcourt; and the 
Western Ijaw Division of Port-Harcourt.  But in the six years of its 
19
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existence, it made no significant mark.  Subsequently, it was 
consigned into oblivion with the military coup of 1966.  
Following the return of the country to democratic rule in 1979, the 
region re-entered the national consciousness in the wake of agitations 
for a special focus on the development of the region. By way of 
response, the then civilian administration of Shehu Shagari set up a 
Presidential Task Force (PTF). The task force was given the mandate 
to address the peculiarities of the region.  It was allocated 1.5 per cent 
of the Federation Account to carry out its assignment.  The successive 
coups that brought to power Muhammadu Buhari and Ibrahim 
Babangida, did not immediately lead to its death.  But a few years into 
the Babangida regime, it was abandoned.   
It is apposite to point out here that the 1.5 per cent allocation clearly 
represents the neglect and indifference which attended the crises in the 
Niger-Delta area.  In previous eras, from the first republic onwards, 
what accrued to the then Eastern region was much more than this 
paltry amount.  Indeed, what is not highly appreciated was that, it was 
at the height of the civil war that the then military government took a 
number of measures, which substantially reduced the fiscal resources 
which were due to the Niger-Delta area.
The high-point of these measures was that, in order to remove any 
doubt as regards who should receive oil revenues, in 1969, a special 
covenant was structured between the Federal Government and the Oil 
Companies. For those who may wish to recall, the immediate trigger 
for the special covenant was the tussle between the Federal 
Government and the then Republic of Biafra as regards who was the 
lawful recipient of revenues from the then oil company Shell-BP. 
Among other things, the covenant stipulated that the Federal 
Government was the only lawful authority in Nigeria to whom 
payments of oil should be made at all times. The irony here is that a 
20
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Saro Wiwa, who jumped on the bandwagon of the winning Federal 
side, found that by 1970, when the war ended, the winners knew 
themselves.  And Saro Wiwa as a social force, was certainly not one of 
them.
As pointed out earlier, the government in its attempts to address the 
crisis in the Niger-Delta, has attempted a mix of methods, which range 
from coercion through cooption to the establishment of commissions. 
These various responses will constitute the subsequent focus of our 
analyses.
One method which the Government has used to address the problem is 
the forceful descent on the various communities. In Ogoniland and 
other troubled areas of the Niger-Delta, thousands of regular and 
mobile policemen, complemented by battalions of soldiers and 
plainclothes security agents were in combat readiness.  Moreover, in 
the attempt to contend the challenges of a conscious and mobilized 
citizenry in the Niger-Delta, the Government established the Rivers 
State Internal Security Task Force, under the leadership of Major Paul 
11
Okutimo. 
According to credible reports, the Task Force was well known for 
terrorizing the communities in Rivers State and part of what is now 
Bayelsa State. But rather than diminish, militancy continued to rise in 
the Niger-Delta.  Moreover, in strategic terms, the militants seemed to 
have effectively learnt from the fate of the Ogonis, who were over-run 
by the military. The various fighting forces have vowed that, the 
Ogoni mistake would never be repeated. It has been decided therefore 
that, if and when war breaks out, the land access would be secured, 
with a view to stranding the enemy.
Besides, the other flashpoints are almost totally encircled by water. 
And if the Warri experience was anything to go by, it was shown that 
the Nigerian Navy has a lot to learn about the mangrove creeks of the 
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Niger-Delta. It has been contended that the militants' mastery of the 
thousand and one water ways, through the intricate mangrove creeks, 
stupefied the Nigerian navy. It is important to stress here that the State 
has not always acted alone. Its efforts have always been 
complemented by those of the oil companies. As reported by Ken Saro 
Wiwa in one of his books, a major stakeholder like Shell even goes as 
far as providing arms and ammunition for the Nigerian State.  
There has also however been, a less militaristic attempt to solve the 
problem.  This can be observed in the creation of agencies like 
OMPADEC, the PTF, the NDDC, and the Ministry of Niger Delta 
Affairs. The first of these i.e. the Oil Minerals Producing Areas 
Development Commission (OMPADEC), was established in 1992 by 
the Babangida administration.  The then military President gave 
OMPADEC the mandate of transforming the region.
Specifically, through the 1992 Decree, the Commission was charged 
among other things, with the responsibility of:
§ rehabilitating and developing the oil producing areas;
§ tackling ecological problems that have arisen from the 
exploration of oil minerals; and
§ liaising with the various oil companies on matters of pollution 
control.
However, by 1999, when it was wound up, OMPADEC had as 
achievements, projects which had no bearing on poverty reduction, 
which is considered a major challenge in the region.
It has even been asserted that OMPADEC turned out to be a huge 
fraud.  According to reports, it was brought to its knees by the top brass 
of the Commission.  By the time its pioneering Chairman was 
removed, billions of naira had been sunk into either white- elephant or 
non-existent projects.  Similarly, billions of naira were sunk into 
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Buguma, the home town of this top functionary, while Nembe with 
four flow stations and one pipeline was largely ignored.  
On his own part, General Sani Abacha established the Petroleum 
(Special) Trust Fund (PTF), headed by Major-General Muhammadu 
Buhari. The PTF as it turned out, confined its activities mainly to the 
Northern part of the country.  This in itself was ironical, since the Niger 
12
Delta, where the oil came from, was in more need of development. 
It must be pointed out here however that, some two years after its 
establishment, the people of Nembe came into contact with the (PTF).  
On September, 1, 1998, they woke up to find that in the dead of the 
night, a giant PTF sign-board had been mounted in the community.  To 
ensure that it was not removed, the sign was securely cemented to the 
ground.  The giant signboard promised the community a water scheme 
13
soon! 
Following the failure of these interventionist bodies, the government 
proceeded to establish the Niger-Delta Development Commission 
(NDDC).  But the intervening years witnessed an upsurge of restivity 
among the peoples of the Niger-Delta. Thus, by 1998, the Niger-Delta, 
had become a volatile zone, characterized by protests, agitations and 
communal conflicts. 
This was the predominant scenario, which impelled the federal 
government to establish the Niger-Delta Development Commission 
(NDDC).  The main objective of the Commission is to formulate and 
implement programmes for the development of the region in the areas 
of transportation, health, education, industrialization, agriculture, 
housing, telecommunication, etc. 
The funding of the NDDC derives from various sources like: The 
Federal Government; Oil and Gas processing companies; the 
Ecological fund and proceeds from other NDDC assets. In 
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collaboration with the various stakeholders like the oil companies, 
development agencies and civil society, the NDDC facilitated the 
production of the Niger-Delta Regional Development Master Plan.  
And a Partner for Sustainable Development (PSD) forum was 
established to implement the Master Plan.
It remains to be seen however, whether the NDDC will be able to 
deliver, and thus hopefully end this particular nightmare of the 
Nigerian state. At the moment, such hopes are very dim, if only 
because the violence until recent times continued unabated. Moreover, 
it has assumed other novel and frightening dimensions, which spell 
doom, not only for the Niger-Delta, but also the Nigerian state itself. 
Meanwhile, NDDC itself is bedeviled by problems of poor funding 
and corruption. The latter feature is of such magnitude that helmsmen 
of the NDDC usually seek to transit from its corridors to the various 
Government Mansions across the Niger-Delta.
This pessimistic note is clearly inconsistent with the fact that a social 
force from the Niger Delta currently presides over the Nigerian state. 
On this score the point to note is that the problem goes beyond the 
character and inclinations of the social force in the Villa.
Another way in which attempts have been made to manage the Niger-
Delta problem is through the policy of co-option.  Co-option involves 
a situation in which important social forces are given top positions in 
the political hierarchy of the country.  It is arguable that co-option 
appears to have reached its zenith with the selection of Dr. Goodluck 
Azikiwe Ebele Jonathan as the running mate to Musa Yar'adua in one 
of the presidential elections.  His consequent appointment as the Vice-
President of Nigeria ensured a situation in which, probably for the first 
time in the history of Nigeria, there was esconsed in Aso Rock, a 
critical social force and a number of aides, who hail from the Niger-
Delta. 
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This co-option seems to have paid off since Goodluck Jonathan, in his 
capacity as the then Vice-President, visited the various militants in 
their dens at Okerenko, Oporoza and other communities.  Moreover, 
he has had to chair the Federal Government Committee, which was 
negotiating with the youths.  But even then, this strategy of having Dr. 
Goodluck Jonathan as Chairman seems to have backfired.  It has 
backfired in the sense that some perceptive observers have 
commented that, should the Yar'adua government fail to transform the 
situation in the Niger-Delta; the blame would be on the then Vice-
14
President, and not the system.  
But as if to indicate that God is indeed a Nigerian, the situation has 
been transformed such that Goodluck Jonathan is now the President of 
the Federal Republic of Nigeria. And, indeed, one of his immediate 
and influential aides is Oronto Douglas, who has since moved from the 
barricades of civil society to an opulent office in the Presidency. What 
this suggests is that the Nigerian problem in relation to oil is not hinged 
on psychological variables; rather it is a structural problem.
We will now turn, if only briefly, to how the Nigerian state through 
legislations and policy organs, has attempted to contain the 
environmental hazards spawned by the oil industry.   The institutional 
framework for environmental protection centres around the then 
Federal Environmental Protection Agency (FEPA), and the National 
Policy on the Environment. The other relevant agency is the Natural 
Resources Conservation Council (NRCC). This is apart from a body 
like the Ministry of Environment. 
The NRCC was established to coordinate policies related to the 
conservation of habitats, species and natural resources.  In broad 
terms, it is committed to a national policy that ensures sustainable 
development, based on proper management of the environment, in 
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order to meet the needs of present and future generations. It further 
provides for the replication of environmental protection agencies at 
other levels of government, that is, at the state and local government. 
The implication of this is that, as regards the Niger-Delta situation, the 
various states and the local governments in the region ought to have 
been sufficiently equipped to contend with the environmental hazards 
15
in the place. 
Meanwhile the framework for managing the Nigerian environment is 
set out in the decree setting up the FEPA and in about 26 laws.  But the 
environmental policies and laws 
regulating the oil industry are replete with drawbacks. Regulatory 
agencies like the Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR), and 
Petroleum Inspectorate Commission (PIC) lack both the autonomy 
and the resources needed to regulate the very sophisticated operations 
in the oil industry.  In other words, as far as the Nigerian state and other 
subnational forces are concerned, money or better still, cash is the 
main preoccupation.  And this may well explain why, the Nigerian 
state, in managing the crisis of the Niger-Delta, has also attempted to 
use the policy of increased funding to the various governmental 
agencies in the Niger-Delta.  
As regards funding, it will be recalled here that in an earlier phase of 
this lecture, attention was drawn to the fact that the civil war ensured a 
situation whereby the principle of derivation was relegated to the 
background.  In its place was a highly centralized system of fiscal 
federalism, whereby all the monies derived from oil exploration 
accrued to the Federal or Central Government.  This lopsidedness 
constitutes one of the major pillars of the Niger-Delta crises.  
Incidentally and ironically enough, it was in Stavanger, Norway, that 
the Federal Government was advised to give the people of the Delta 
their fair share of the oil revenue.  This may well explain the transition 
from 1.5 per cent   to 13 per cent.  In the process, it is arguable that 
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although the current 13 per cent falls far short of what the various 
Niger-Delta peoples are clamouring for, yet observers are of the view 
that if the famed 13 per cent had been judiciously utilised, something 
of a turnaround would have been occurring in the Niger-Delta by now. 
This is moreso, if a prudent use of the 13 per cent is complemented 
with similarly prudent policy organs like the NDDC and the Ministry 
of Niger Delta Affairs.
Two different observations seem to have validated the contention that 
the funding that has gone into the Niger-Delta has merely been 
frittered away by the various status quo forces in the region. The first 
was a study conducted by the Port-Harcourt based Centre for Africa 
Social Studies (CASS).  
In this illuminating study, it was revealed that the increased funding in 
the Niger-Delta, has been hall-marked by features like: plunder, 
financial recklessness and a monumental misplacement of priorities. 
More recently, it was also revealed in a less hallowed context that, 
what has gone into the Niger-Delta by way of funding has simply been 
wasted.  In this respect, the observations of a columnist are very 
16
instructive: 
 …The traffic at Eleme junction continues to be an 
embarrassment to everybody as the proposed flyover 
bridge refuses to become a reality.  Yenagoa continues 
to be largely a one street city. Means of transportation 
to Bonny is still the Flying boats with outboard engines 
….
  Replicate this situation in almost all spheres of life and 
you have the Niger-Delta.
The writer went on to use the year 2006 (alone) as a benchmark.  In 
that particular year, the total allocation to Rivers State was 153 billion 
naira. Bayelsa State got 116 billion.  By contrast, non oil-producing 
27
Covenant University Public Lecture Series. Vol. 2, No. 2, October, 2013
states like Kwara and Ebonyi got 23 billion and 21 billion 
respectively.  Indeed, it has been revealed that each of the dominant oil 
bearing states got about five times, what accrued to some other states.  
In this respect, the columnist went on to ask some pointed questions: 
What did they do with the money?  What did they provide for their 
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people with the resources allocated?  The observer might be tempted 
to counter here that these questions in themselves do not address the 
roots of the Niger-Delta crises.  This observation, as true as it is, 
clearly shows that all along, the various policy options as earnest as 
they seem to be, cannot address in any serious way, the crises of the 
Niger-Delta.
Indeed, what is clearly evident is that, there are larger and much more 
fundamental issues, other than funding, which should have been 
addressed at the inception of the Nigerian oil industry. Vice 
Chancellor Sir, Ladies and Gentlemen it was the failure of the 
Nigerian state to address such fundamental problems that has 
ultimately brought about the Niger-Delta crises.  
 
In this respect, it is apposite to ask here: What are these fundamental 
problems? Perhaps the main one is that right from 1958 till date, the 
productive base of the oil industry has continued to elude Nigeria and 
Nigerians.
This productive base centres on the fact that the technical knowledge 
which underpins the industry is still alien to the country. This is 
something of a paradox, if only because, this is a country with over one 
hundred and twenty five (125) universities and equivalent number of 
Polytechnics and Technical Colleges. Yet, and despite the lacuna 
identified above, Nigeria and Nigerians have never refrained from 
basking in the glow of being an oil power.
It is in reality an oil power status which thrives merely on the 
stupendous petro-dollars flowing into the nation's treasury. By 
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contrast, we do not know much about the oil industry, and if we do, we 
have continued to behave as ignoramus outsiders in the oil industry.
Meanwhile, the oil power status has seen Nigeria and Nigerians going 
around with bloated ambition and aspirations, and misguided 
priorities. Such euphoria can be observed in chest-thumping and 
narcissistic rhetoric like Nigeria being the giant of Africa. At a more 
sickening and materialistic level, the cash-induced-oil-power status 
sees the country importing everything and anything from toothpicks 
to rice. Indeed, and as regards the latter, no less an authoritative person 
than the Central Bank Governor has revealed that in the year 2010 
alone, Nigeria imported rice to the tune of one billion dollars. And, I 
tell you, the figure has been on the rise since then.
Vice-Chancellor Sir, ladies and gentlemen, it is this dismal and 
pathetic scenario which has brought about what I have chosen to call 
the 'Yamani Syndrome'. By way of a brief explanation, Zaki Yamani 
was the famous and flamboyant Saudi Oil Minister. At the height of 
the 1973 oil embargo, which saw the Arab world virtually re-defining 
the nature of international economic relations, Yamani cautioned at 
the peak of the euphoria that, if the oil resource and the oil weapon are 
not used properly, one was behaving like the foolish soldier, who fires 
a bullet in the air, only for the self-same bullet to be inflicted on the 
source.
In broad terms, the immediate foregoing constitutes the tragedy of the 
Nigerian condition or non-condition. Such is the perverse links 
between oil and Nigeria that, owing to the prophetic insights of a Zaki 
Yamani, oil has turned into a feature which has helped to orchestrate 
the worst aspects of our existence. The indices of such existence 
include a magniloquent profile that is in a sharp and sad contrast to our 
productive base. For instance if a car is produced in the US today, in a 
few days, such a car will be cruising our streets in Lagos and Abuja.
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Meanwhile, as if to completely fulfill the apocalyptic prophesies of 
Zaki Yamani, oil which if properly handled should have been the basis 
of our prosperity, has become one of the main sources of our 
instability. Unfortunately, this instability has potentially mortal 
consequences for the Nigerian nation. Indeed, the grim reflection in 
some scholarly circles is that, a book is waiting to be written-and this 
book will probably be titled: Oil and the Mortality of the Nigerian 
State.
Yet, a critical look reveals that the mortality of the Nigerian state is not 
an inevitability. This is obvious enough in view of the fact that some 
countries have been able to use the self-same variable, i.e. oil, as the 
basis for re-defining and re-validating their existence.
In saying all of these, it was not as if there was no struggle to reclaim 
what ought to be Nigeria's soul in the oil industry. As revealed by 
Terisa Turner, there was indeed a struggle between two factions of the 
then ruling elite, as regards the direction in which the Nigerian oil 
industry should go. According to this radical oil analyst, there were the 
bureaucrats on the one hand, and the technocrats on the other.  The 
former wanted a cosy relationship with the oil companies, while the 
technocrats envisaged a situation in which, in the course of time, an 
authentic oil industry would emerge in Nigeria.  But given the post-
colonial contraption, which was the hall-mark of Nigeria, the 
bureaucrats carried the day and in the process, the technocrats and by 
extension, Nigeria lost out.  In losing out thus, other indices in the 
Nigerian nation also lost out.  Perhaps, the most obvious of these was 
the Niger Delta.  As the oil money flowed in, issues like the 
environmental damage and stunted development of the Niger Delta 
were relegated to the background, until activists and visionaries like 
Boro and later Saro Wiwa came along.  
However, such is the tragic inevitability spawned by oil that, even a 
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Ken Saro Wiwa could not grasp the depth of the tragedy spawned by 
oil in a stunted, post-colonial social formation like Nigeria.  At a point 
in time, when Ken Saro Wiwa was asked what he wanted done for the 
Ogoni, in particular and the Niger Delta in general, he replied, 'we 
18
want more money and a restructured Nigerian polity'.   Incidentally, 
these two interrelated demands constitute the kernel of the solutions, 
which are being offered as panaceas to the Niger Delta crisis.  We 
might as well address the viability and implications of these solutions 
in turn.
As regards the issue of more money flowing into the Niger Delta, 
observers will agree that, since Saro Wiwa made this statement, more 
money has indeed been pumped into the region, and yet the Niger 
Delta continues to wallow in squalor. The reasons for this interesting 
outcome are not so much that the governors and top functionaries in 
the region are corrupt, but that it simply reflects the classic maxim that: 
THE WAY A STATE EARNS ITS MONEY WILL DETERMINE 
THE WAY THAT MONEY WILL BE SPENT.  A newspaper 
editorial captures what is being said here with this poignant title:  “A 
fool and your money'.
But beyond this visceral dimension is that unearned and unmerited oil 
revenues also have a way of rupturing the civic linkage, which ought to 
exist between the government and the governed in Nigeria. How does 
one, for instance, explain the fact that despite the monumental 
corruption by the Niger Delta governors and their counterparts in the 
rest of Nigeria, there is hardly a whimper of protest from the Nigerian 
populace.  
The answer to this unusual situation lies in the fact that the stupendous 
revenues, which came to the Nigeria state, were mere rents and not 
owed to taxes from the populace. Rather, they were owed to the 
exertions of social forces like Shell, Statoil and other associated 
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variables. If these revenues, which are being plundered and stolen, had 
been generated from the Nigerian populace by way of taxes, chances 
are that, there would have been a very spirited reaction from the 
Nigerian populace. 
In this kind of situation where providential revenues constitute the 
mainstay of the Nigerian state, what you have on the one hand is 
apathy, and a maddening rush on the other to have a privileged access 
to the petrodollars.  And this is why, what was quoted in the opening of 
this piece becomes relevant: “Aren't we all parasites?  For a 
country which consumes without producing, it is just about time 
that we refocus the debate”.
In order to fully appreciate  that the central issue of taxation is partly 
the problem, we only have to recall that, at a point in time in Nigeria's 
history, a particular regional government, i.e. the Western regional 
government, was locked in a battle with farmers over the issue of 
taxation.  It was an epic encounter, in which the government was 
virtually worsted. 
Thereafter, the government simply withdrew, and fell back on the 
expedient of relying on oil revenues for its sustenance.  In any case, 
and at that point in time, oil prices were on the rise.  What this episode 
clearly demonstrates is that, taxation is at the heart of the civic rigour, 
which exists in most democratic societies.  As we shall see, in most 
democratic societies, including Norway, it is this critical issue of 
taxation which partly explains the different outcomes that the oil 
industry has generated in Norway on the one hand and Nigeria on the 
other. And in focusing on Norway here, let me begin by 
acknowledging my intellectual debt to Terry Lynn Karl, a Professor at 
Stanford University.
In Norway, the structures which received oil were radically different 
from those of Nigeria and other developing countries.  The oil 
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companies did not encounter a weak state, a poor country or a 
predatory, post-colonial, cum authoritarian ruler.  Instead, Norway in 
the 1960s was already one of the world's wealthiest, most equitable and 
most democratic countries. The most thinly populated country in 
Europe was characterized by relative cultural homogeneity, relatively 
low levels of urbanization, and a diversified economy based primarily 
on agriculture, forestry, fishing, shipping, and manufacturing.  
Unemployment was close to nil, growth had been steady for two 
decades, and poverty was virtually eliminated by a welfare state 
supported by a diversified tax base.
First, in Norway was, in Olsen's words, “a typical civil servants' 
state,” which came remarkably close to what Weber labelled an ideal 
bureaucracy operating under rational legal authority.  Its strong roots 
could be traced back to at least 1680, and its legal status was enshrined 
in the first independent constitution of 1814.  In the absence of 
competing political and socioeconomic elites, this long continuity 
firmly established the tenure of civil servants, their professional 
qualities, their career paths, and their unity. After the 1840s, state 
officialdom became more heterogeneous, more specialized, more 
expert, and more open to those groups most affected by public policies.  
By the 1970s, when oil was discovered, civil servants were 
considerably entrenched in a long bureaucratic tradition, and they 
formed the core of a lean, autonomous, and highly efficient public-
sector apparatus.
Several features of this civil-service state were especially notable.  
First, recruitment was solely by merit; thus civil servants were the best 
educated of all major elite groups and among the most prestigious.  
Because they were an elite group, they realistically perceived their 
opportunities as better inside the state than in the private sector.  
Second, civil servants were unusually insulated from and impervious 
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to influence peddling.  Advancement depended on nominations from 
the top civil servants, and outsiders rarely could sway those choices.  
Although bureaucrats were more engaged in political parties, interest 
organizations, and other public activities than the population at large, 
strong norms made arbitrary intervention by political leaders or 
organized interests illegitimate.  
Actions of this sort were likely to be strongly criticized in the 
parliament and the mass media.  Third, corruption was simply 
nonexistent. Since the eighteenth century, strong mechanisms of 
accountability, including ombudspeople, special courts, and public 
access to documents, and even stronger norms ruled out such 
behaviour.  Fourth, the behaviour of civil servants was predictably 
cautious and incrementalist and was based on expertise and strong 
17
organizational routines.  In sum, this “civil-service state” was the 
complete antithesis of Nigeria.
This unusual high degree of stateness was complemented by Norway's 
open and participatory democracy.  Its regime, though well known for 
the predominance of a single party, was characterized by an unusual 
combination of high participation and stability, as well as an orderly 
system of “corporate pluralism”, in which associations of workers, 
employers, farmers, and fishermen bargained with each other and with 
the state over development priorities. The resulting balance of forces 
moderated pressures toward politicization and also prevented Weber's 
“dictatorship of the bureaucrats.”  In this exceptionally favourable 
environment, the prevailing policy style emphasized caution in the 
face of change, respect for standard operating procedure, segmentation 
according to issue area, consensus building, and egalitarianism.
The discovery of huge oil and gas fields occurred in this context.  In 
marked contrast to the situation in Nigeria and other oil-exporting 
countries, multinational companies were forced to bargain with the 
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representatives of a highly developed state bureaucracy, who felt no 
strong need for a qualitatively new revenue base.  Organizing a 
framework for controlling the oil industry required a high degree of 
sophistication in planning and administration, which Norway, unlike 
other oil exporters, possessed in abundance. 
Thus, as the companies negotiated with the state, they came up against 
top civil servants, whose lack of knowledge about petroleum matters 
was counterbalanced by their expertise,  prudence, and 
incorruptibility.  In contrast to their counterparts in the developing 
countries, they were in no rush to start oil production, which was 
initially viewed as adding marginally to an already healthy growth 
rate, and they could not be pushed to proceed until they were 
institutionally ready.
The contrast with Nigeria is also evident in Norway's superior 
capacity to control the impact of petroleum on its existing institutions.  
This ability was due not only to the professionalism of the civil 
service, but also to the existence of non-oil-based “vested” interests, 
who were able to present their concerns in a democratic context.    
Indeed, most organized economic and political forces professed some 
hostility to this potential threat to the Norwegian way of life (even as 
they welcomed its benefits), with the fishing industry, environmental 
groups, and farmers, who were the most consistent opponents of oil-
led development.
Norway also stands in marked contrast to the other oil exporters in its 
ability to ward off the insidious rentier behaviour that accompanied 
booms elsewhere.  Its governments could thus retain the historically 
acquired flexibility that permitted them to limit lock-in and to engage 
in timely (rather than postponed) adjustments. Therefore, oil revenues 
were not dissipated through corruption and white-elephant projects.
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Perhaps most indicative of its different behaviour, the Norwegian 
government sought to protect the state's non-oil fiscal capacity.  As 
corporate revenues from petroleum shot up, it resisted the strong 
temptation to permit oil revenues to replace its normal revenue base 
by lowering taxes. Unlike all other exporters, it managed to sustain its 
domestic tax base, although it did suffer some erosion.  
Taxes remained progressive, and they contributed to another unique 
outcome: petroleum revenues, which produced wider income 
disparities in most other oil exporting countries, contributed to a more 
equitable distribution of income there. Rather than replace non-oil 
taxation, Norway put much of its recent bonuses into a “petroleum 
fund,” set up to store wealth for the next century, when its oil starts to 
run out. Taken together, these factors cushioned the adjustment 
necessary in the face of oscillating oil prices and generally protected 
Norwegians from the tremendous swings that citizens in other 
exporting countries experienced.
Moreover, with the advent of oil discovery, Norway also revamped its 
educational system, to meet the demands and requirements of the then 
emergent oil industry.  Lastly, it must be said here that Norway, 
although deficient in oil technology in the sixties, was able to adapt its 
technology in the area of ship-building to fashion a home-grown oil 
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technology of its own. 
It is arguable, however that comparison with Norway is a misplaced 
one. A more relevant comparison can be made with a country like 
Malaysia – a social formation which shares broad similarities with 
Nigeria. In this particular country, an authentic industry has 
developed, courtesy of its national oil company, Petronas. The upshot 
is that Malaysia, courtesy of resource nationalism, has been able to 
give the multinationals a good run for their technical and 'creative' 
devices.
6.0 Conclusion:
The immediate foregoing speaks to the deadly impasse, which is 
currently the lot of the Niger Delta and Nigeria.  In essence, therefore, 
all the various solutions, which have thus far been proffered, cannot 
address in any meaningful way, the various malformations and 
distortions in the Nigerian oil industry, which have spawned the Niger 
Delta crises. What is therefore needed is an overhaul of the subsisting 
policies, which have generated, over time, the monumental crises in 
the Niger Delta.
One central feature of this policy lies in the fact that till date, the 
productive dynamics of the oil industry continue to elude us. What is 
probably not well known is that from the crude oil alone, Nigerian has 
the capacity to generate gasoline, kerosene, chemicals, polymers, and 
naphtha, such that in a well managed state, Nigeria would not have to 
import anything from the outside world. 
When this bleak scenario is complemented with the fact, if we had in 
place, viable steel industries, then Nigeria would have been on her 
way to being a Super-power in the authentic sense. Unfortunately, the 
Nigerian steel industry has merely followed on the heels of the 
Nigerian oil industry. Who knows, the foregoing may well and partly 
explain why one of the then presidential candidates was reported to 
have wept for Nigeria.
And I do not wish to sound blasphemous here, yet we only have to 
remember that the greatest human being, who ever walked this earth, 
was also reported to have wept at a point in time. “Jesus Wept” at the 
grave of Lazarus (John 11:35). 
Vice-Chancellor Sir, Ladies and Gentlemen, beyond the lachrymose 
exertions is that outsiders have also had to tell us openly and pointedly 
that at a fundamental level, there is something seriously wrong with 
Nigeria. In this respect, the depositions of a French Professor of 
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International Relations are worth recalling.
In the course of a Seminar on Nigeria's Foreign Policy in 2004, at 
Oxford University, the French Professor declared tersely that: the 
threat potential to Nigeria is Nigeria itself. 
In the euphoria of a new dawn which has been largely occasioned by 
Nigeria's recent birthday, it is tempting to dismiss the French 
Professor as a mere alarmist. After all, the crises in the Niger Delta 
seem to have abated in view of the fact that social forces like 
Goodluck Jonathan and Oronto Douglas are now calling the shots in 
Aso Rock.
However, to think along this line is to mistake the woods for the tree. 
For all said and done, and as I speak, the bankrupt relationship 
between Nigeria and the oil companies continues to exist. Similarly, 
the creaky contraption called the Federal Republic of Nigeria is still in 
place. Whereas, everyone knows, the social formation called The 
Federal Republic of Nigeria is neither Federal nor Republican!
Thus, if the three-year old administration of Goodluck Jonathan hopes 
to give Nigeria a new lease of life, it must urgently address the 
fundamental problems which bedevil the Nigerian oil industry on the 
one hand and the Federal Republic of Nigeria on the other.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
Otherwise and for a very long time, the Yamani Syndrome will occupy 
a permanent seat in the cockpit of the Nigerian state.
But even then, Yamani was not the only social force who warned about 
the counter-productive currents which govern oil. Perez Alfonso, the 
Venezuelan Oil Minister also demonstrated in a graphic way the 
Paleolithic destiny which awaits Nigeria, in view of her feeding-bottle 
reliance on oil revenues. And this is why, Mr. Vice-Chancellor Sir, 
with your kind permission, I wish to close this public lecture with this 
short but true story, about an aspect of Perez Alfonso's life, which 
speaks in a painful and ominous way to Nigeria's past, present and 
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future.
Perez Alfonso returned to Caracas to take up the position of Oil 
Minister in Venezuela. He was struck by how much more affluence the 
Caracas of 1958, buoyed by oil earnings, looked than the Caracas he 
had fled a decade earlier. His response was not altogether favourable. 
Oil wealth, he believed, was the gift of nature and politics, and not of 
hard work, and he soon found a perfect symbol for what he saw as its 
pernicious consequences. While still in exile in Mexico, the family had 
managed to get the money together to buy a 1950 Singer, a British 
motorcar that looked rather like an MG. Perez Alfonso treasured the 
car; it was one of his indulgences. When he came back to Venezuela, 
he arranged to have the Singer shipped after him. The car arrived at 
the docks, where it sat for two months, rusting away; no one bothered 
to tell Perez Alfonso that it was there. At last, hearing of its arrival, 
Perez Alfonso sent a mechanic down to the harbour to drive the car up 
to Caracas. Along the way, it broke down. The mechanic had forgotten 
to check the oil, and it turned out that there had been no oil in the 
engine. The car could no longer be driven at all; the engine was 
completely burned out. A truck had to be sent for it. Eventually, it was 
delivered to his villa in the suburbs. But the corrosion had eaten 
through the car. Perez Alfonso viewed it all like a sign from heaven; he 
had the car installed near a ping-pong table in his garden, as a 
corroded, overgrown shrine and symbol of what he saw as the dangers 
of oil wealth for a nation – laziness, the spirit of not caring, the 
commitment to buying and consuming and wasting.   
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